Recent Developments in Alternative Dispute Resolution in banking, financial and insurance matters in the Italian and Spanish experience

by Alberto J. Tapia Hermida – Francesco Affinito

Abstract: This article examines recent developments in Alternative Dispute Resolution mechanisms in the banking, financial and insurance sectors, offering a comparative analysis of the divergent experiences in Italy and Spain. Within the Italian system, the introduction of  «Arbitro Assicurativo» (AAS) completes a sector-specific ADR architecture, already structured around «Arbitro Bancario Finanziario» (ABF) and «Arbitro per le Controversie Finanziarie» (ACF). This framework establishes a tripartite model linked to the respective supervisory authorities (Banca d’Italia, Consob and IVASS), in which the dispute resolution function is integrated with regulatory and supervisory functions. In the current Spanish legal system, the reform of December 2025 preserves the tripartite structure of the complaints services of the Banco de España, CNMV and DGSFP, for each segment of the financial market. However, a reform has long been under consideration that would envisage the establishment of a single authority competent for the out-of-court resolution of all banking, financial and insurance disputes, through the adoption of a system aimed at centralising consumer protection functions within a single independent body. The analysis, in addition to revisiting the debate on the possible consolidation of the banking, financial and insurance matters under a single regulatory framework, highlights how the different systems reflect distinct regulatory and institutional choices, with significant implications for the efficiency of ADR mechanisms, consumer protection and the coordination between financial market supervision and dispute resolution functions.

Summary: 1. Introduction – 2. The establishment of Arbitro Assicurativo within the Italian system of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the banking, financial and insurance sectors – 3. Amendment of the Financial Consumer Protection System in Spain through Law No. 10 of 2025 – 4. Concluding Remarks.

1. Introduction

In recent years, alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms have assumed an increasingly central role in shaping a model of «proximity justice» that is both complementary to judicial adjudication and capable of reconciling efficiency, accessibility, and effective protection of rights within regulated sectors.[1]

Across the European Union, each Member State has responded in a distinct and context-specific manner to the impulses of the European legislator and to the need to provide new instruments of consumer protection, as also required by the action of the EU Institutions. In recent years, the national experiences of out-of-court dispute resolution in the banking, financial and insurance sectors have diverged, as against a form of protection that is instead expected to assume an increasingly transnational character in the pursuit of the full development of the European single market, and to display a growing tendency towards the harmonisation of rules, procedures and remedies.

Against this background, the following analysis outlines the most recent developments in Italian and Spanish law in this field. The comparison reflects the underlying premises of the present inquiry, highlighting a parallelism which, by its very nature, stands in tension with the concept of integration and thus encapsulates the subject matter under consideration.

The recent introduction of the Insurance Ombudsman (Arbitro Assicurativo, AAS) into the Italian legal system – representing a significant evolutionary step and building upon the experience gained with the Banking and Financial Ombudsman (Arbitro Bancario Finanziario, ABF)[2] and the Financial Disputes Arbitrator (Arbitro per le Controversie Finanziarie, ACF)[3] – stands in marked contrast to the Spanish reform project, which instead envisages, across the three relevant sectors (banking, financial and insurance), the establishment of a single authority competent for the out-of-court resolution of disputes.

Within the Italian framework, the new body, established by Ministerial Decree No. 215 of 6 November 2024 of the Ministry of Enterprises and Made in Italy, completes a process initiated years ago at the European level and progressively implemented by the Italian legislator, aimed at ensuring a specialised system of out-of-court protection in relationships between intermediaries and clients. The relevant regulatory framework, strongly influenced by Directive (EU) 2016/97 on insurance distribution (IDD), the Private Insurance Code and the Consumer Code, outlines a system which, while grounded in pre-existing models, introduces elements of functional adaptation to the specific features of insurance relationships, characterised by greater technical complexity and the involvement of multiple actors, including undertakings, intermediaries, brokers, agents and, not least, consumers.

The establishment of the Insurance Ombudsman must therefore be understood within this context and within the logic of the “third ADR pillar” of independent authorities, alongside those already consolidated in the banking and financial sectors.[4] This responds both to requirements of rationalisation and systemic coherence, and to the need to rebalance the informational and contractual asymmetries that characterise the insurance market, which in recent years has expanded well beyond the scope of mandatory risk coverage to encompass innovative and technologically advanced sectors.

In the Spanish experience – where attention to out-of-court dispute resolution mechanisms has deeper historical roots[5] – the current framework partially overlaps with the Italian one, particularly with regard to the tripartite allocation of competences to the complaints services of the Banco de España (for banking disputes), the Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores (CNMV) (for financial disputes), and the Dirección General de Seguros y Fondos de Pensiones (DGSFP) (for insurance matters). In particular, the DGSFP manages its complaints service, which examines claims submitted by consumers against insurance undertakings, intermediaries and pension funds.

In this regard, it should be noted that Law No. 10 of 2025 has recently amended the system for the protection of financial consumers originally established by Law No. 44/2002,[6] including the procedures for submitting complaints to the aforementioned bodies.[7] Moreover, a further reform concerning out-of-court dispute resolution in insurance, banking and financial matters has long been pending final approval.[8] This reform would entail the transfer of such functions from the respective supervisory authorities to a single body, namely the Independent Administrative Authority for the Protection of Financial Consumers (Autoridad Administrativa Independiente de Defensa del Cliente Financiero),[9] an entity independent from the supervisory authorities and entirely lacking coordination with them.

The current parliamentary debate revolves around whether to confirm this solution or, as advocated by the supervisory authorities themselves, to adopt at least a «twin peaks» model,[10] considered more effective than the proposal currently under consideration and, moreover, closer to the hybrid Italian model.

The « twin peaks» model does not focus directly on arbitration or specific dispute resolution mechanisms, but rather on the organisation of financial supervision, based on the separation of two key functions[11]: on the one hand, prudential supervision, aimed at ensuring the soundness and financial stability of intermediaries – such as banks, insurance companies and other entities – by preventing systemic risks and ensuring adequate capital levels; on the other hand, conduct supervision and consumer protection, focused on safeguarding consumer rights and ensuring the transparency and fairness of commercial practices, preventing fraud and protecting investors and consumers of financial and insurance products.

Nevertheless, the critical issues already highlighted in the literature remain,[12] including the need for robust coordination mechanisms among the authorities involved. Indeed, the separation of functions, if not properly managed, may result in increased coordination complexity, thereby requiring effective instruments of cooperation.

Pending the adoption of the forthcoming Spanish legislative reform, both the Italian and Spanish systems retain a common feature: the availability of out-of-court dispute resolution not only as a mechanism for the settlement of disputes, but also as an institutional point of balance between individual protection and collective regulation, and, as will be discussed below, as a potential driver of sector-specific predictive justice, capable of guiding operators’ behaviour and strengthening confidence in the market.

2. The establishment of Arbitro Assicurativo within the Italian system of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the banking, financial and insurance sectors

As of 15 January 2026, the Insurance Ombudsman (Arbitro Assicurativo, AAS) has become operational, thereby completing the framework of the Italian system of out-of-court dispute resolution in the banking, financial and insurance sectors.

The origins of this body can be traced to a dual normative level. At the European level, Directive 2013/11/EU on ADR for consumer disputes and Directive 2016/97/EU (IDD) on insurance distribution required Member States to establish accessible, impartial and independent mechanisms for resolving disputes between consumers and businesses. At the domestic level, this obligation was first implemented in Article 141(7) of the Consumer Code and subsequently in Article 187(1) of the Private Insurance Code, which requires insurance operators to adhere to ADR systems for all disputes relating to insurance services.

Ministerial Decree No. 215/2024 constitutes the implementing act of this dual foundation: on the one hand, compliance with the general framework set out in Title II-bis of the Consumer Code; on the other, the implementation of the sector-specific discipline contained in the Private Insurance Code. This confers upon the AAS a dual nature, functioning both as an instrument of market regulation and as a mechanism for consumer protection.[13]

Accordingly, the current structure of the Italian system of out-of-court dispute resolution in the banking, financial and insurance sectors may be described as a three-pillar system,[14] consisting of: (i) the Banking and Financial Ombudsman (Arbitro Bancario Finanziario, ABF), established pursuant to Article 128-bis of the Consolidated Banking Act and operating under the aegis of the Bank of Italy for banking disputes; (ii) the Financial Disputes Arbitrator (Arbitro per le Controversie Finanziarie, ACF), established by Consob Resolution No. 19602 of 4 May 2016 for disputes between financial intermediaries and investors; and (iii) the Insurance Ombudsman (AAS), now entrusted to IVASS.

The regulatory framework explicitly draws, in both structure and rationale, on the models already developed by the ABF and the ACF, while adapting their functioning to the specific features of the insurance sector. In this way, the Italian legislator takes a step consistent with the broader trend in supervised sectors towards forms of «supervised justice», namely out-of-court mechanisms which, while remaining distinct from judicial adjudication, indirectly contribute to the achievement of prudential and conduct-of-business supervisory objectives pursued by independent authorities.[15]

The 2024 regulatory intervention thus establishes a system that largely replicates the organisational structure of other sectoral arbitral bodies, providing for a collegiate body composed of members appointed by the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Enterprises and Made in Italy, including experts in law, economics and insurance techniques. The decision-making body is supported by a technical secretariat, responsible for preliminary screening and investigation, which receives complaints and assesses their admissibility.

The personal scope of jurisdiction includes any individual who has or has had a contractual relationship with an undertaking or intermediary operating in the Italian territory, as well as, prospectively, entities established in other EU Member States that market insurance products in Italy, concerning insurance services or benefits. The material scope encompasses virtually all insurance contracts, without distinction by class.

The procedure is characterised by simplicity and expediency: claims may be submitted online without mandatory legal representation and must be preceded by a written complaint to the undertaking. Hearings may be held, though they are not mandatory, and decisions must be issued within short time limits. These decisions are published in anonymised form on the IVASS website, thereby enhancing transparency and contributing to the development of consistent interpretative approaches.

Particular importance attaches to the requirement of independence: the governing rules ensure that members of the AAS may be removed only for just cause and that the body operates with functional autonomy with regard to IVASS and the relevant Ministries. This responds to the need to strengthen public confidence in the decisions of independent authorities, in a context where the perception of impartiality is essential to institutional legitimacy.

Beyond its function of protecting individual policyholders, the Insurance Ombudsman also performs an indirect regulatory role, influencing the conduct of undertakings and intermediaries through its case law and the reputational value of its decisions.[16] As with the ABF and the ACF, the effectiveness of AAS decisions does not derive from binding coercive force, but rather from their persuasive authority, encouraging operators to align with established interpretations in order to avoid reputational sanctions or supervisory interventions.

The AAS thus operates as an instrument of institutional «moral suasion»,[17] complementing the regulatory supervision exercised by IVASS, which increasingly moves beyond purely sanction-based approaches towards models of «conciliatory regulation» grounded in dialogue and cooperation between authorities and market participants.[18] In this perspective, the Insurance Ombudsman represents a point of convergence between supervisory functions and consumer protection, bridging the public dimension of regulation with the private dimension of dispute settlement.

The introduction of the AAS consolidates a now mature institutional model of sector-specific ADR, developed over time around the three principal independent authorities operating in financial markets: the Bank of Italy, Consob and IVASS. Together, these bodies constitute a multi-level architecture of alternative justice, integrated with supervisory functions and grounded in a dynamic balance between decisional autonomy and systemic objectives, whereby the resolution of individual disputes becomes a source of institutional learning capable of guiding regulation and ensuring the proper functioning of the market.[19]

In the case of the AAS, the link with IVASS is particularly strong. The Authority, already entrusted with prudential and conduct supervision of the insurance sector, finds in the Ombudsman a complementary tool for monitoring market practices and identifying areas of risk. Contemporary administrative regulation increasingly relies on principles of proportionality, subsidiarity and predictability, which the AAS helps to implement by translating regulatory standards into concrete decisions.[20]

The functional independence of the Ombudsman, while ensuring decisional autonomy, does not preclude informational feedback with supervisory activity. In this respect, AAS decisions may provide IVASS with insights into recurring practices, critical issues and market trends, thereby functioning as a channel of regulatory feedback. Conversely, IVASS guidelines and measures may, in turn, orient AAS case law towards solutions consistent with systemic objectives.

This results in a virtuous synergy between ADR and supervision, already identified as a form of «regulatory justice», capable of reconciling individual protection with overall market stability.[21] From this perspective, the Insurance Ombudsman is not merely a mechanism for reducing litigation, but a genuine instrument of behavioural regulation, whose normative influence extends to the commercial and contractual policies of undertakings.

The effectiveness of this model, however, depends on the ability to ensure interpretative consistency and transparency. The systematic publication of decisions, the development of guiding principles and the public accessibility of interpretative orientations are essential elements for the construction of a sector-specific “decision-making model”, accessible not only to market operators but also to scholars and consumers.

Above all, the establishment of the Insurance Ombudsman marks a highly significant step in the evolution of economic law towards forms of polycentric justice. The new body does not merely provide an alternative remedy to litigation, but embodies a governance model capable of integrating individual protection, systemic regulation and technological innovation.

From an institutional perspective, the AAS represents the materialization of a principle of functional subsidiarity between public and private spheres, whereby the protection of policyholders – similarly to the banking and financial sectors – is no longer entrusted exclusively to state courts, but is shared with an independent institution operating according to criteria of efficiency, impartiality and proximity.

In the insurance sector as well, there is a shift from judicial adjudication to regulatory venues, where the Insurance Ombudsman performs a function of systemic risk prevention. The dissemination of consistent decisions and sound practices reduces informational asymmetries, enhances public trust and contributes to market stability. Undertakings, in turn, find in the AAS not only a control mechanism but also an interpretative guide, enabling them to anticipate regulatory expectations and proactively comply with principles of good conduct towards clients and consumers.

The system described above stands in marked contrast to developments in the Spanish legal system, where – despite a similar tripartite allocation of competences – there is an ongoing move towards the establishment of a single authority competent for banking, financial and insurance disputes.

3. Amendment of the Financial Consumer Protection System in Spain through Law No. 10 of 2025

Out-of-court dispute resolution between financial institutions and their clients in Spain is embedded within the broader system of administrative and alternative consumer protection, developed in the wake of Ombudsman experiences[22] and subsequently shaped on the basis of the same European regulatory premises.

The new system for the protection of financial consumers is established by the Second Final Provision of Law No. 10/2025 of 26 December, which regulates customer service mechanisms and amends Law No. 44/2002 of 22 November on Measures for the Reform of the Financial System. This amendment entered into force on 28 December 2025 and aims to address significant issues of financial exclusion and the technological divide – both demographic and geographical – that have emerged in recent years within the financial market. The structure of the new system rests on two complementary levels: a first level consisting of the customer service departments of financial undertakings, strengthened both substantively and procedurally by Law 10/2025; and a second level based on the complaints services of the sectoral supervisory authorities (the Bank of Spain, the National Securities Market Commission (CNMV), and the Directorate-General for Insurance and Pension Funds (DGSFP)).

Indeed, unlike the Italian legal system – where distinct sector-specific models coexist, such as the Banking and Financial Ombudsman (Arbitro Bancario Finanziario, ABF), the Financial Disputes Arbitrator (Arbitro per le Controversie Finanziarie, ACF), and the recently established Insurance Ombudsman (Arbitro Assicurativo, AAS) – the Spanish experience has traditionally favoured an integrated administrative system based on sector-specific supervisory authorities. This system is coordinated and procedurally homogeneous, being anchored in the respective supervisory authorities (the Bank of Spain and the CNMV) or in the competent Ministry (through the DGSFP), each endowed with its own complaints service.

For the banking and financial sectors, the relevant bodies are the complaints services of the Bank of Spain and the CNMV, each competent within its respective domain and operating under a parallel mechanism. This mechanism requires, first, the submission of a mandatory complaint to the relevant entity and, subsequently, recourse to the supervisory authority, which concludes the procedure by issuing a decision that, while not legally binding, carries significant authoritative weight.

In the insurance sector, the competent authority is the Directorate-General for Insurance and Pension Funds (DGSFP), a body within the Ministry of Economy. The DGSFP manages the complaints service, which examines claims submitted by consumers against insurance undertakings, intermediaries, and pension funds. The procedure is written, free of charge, and does not require legal representation. Typical claims concern, inter alia, the interpretation of policy terms, refusal to pay compensation, delays in claims settlement, unfair contractual clauses, or lack of transparency in information disclosure.[23]

The decisions of the DGSFP do not possess judicial nature nor binding force in the strict sense of a court judgment. Rather, they take the form of reasoned opinions assessing the compliance of the undertaking’s conduct with sectoral regulations and principles of sound insurance practice. Nevertheless, their reputational impact, combined with the supervisory powers of the authority, frequently induces entities to comply with the conclusions reached.

More broadly, the system for resolving disputes between financial institutions and their clients aims at alleviating the burden on the judicial system in financial matters and may be described through the metaphor of a «Ziggurat».[24] The first level consists of sector-specific solutions provided by the customer service departments of financial institutions and customer ombudsmen; the second level is represented by administrative solutions through the complaints services of the Bank of Spain, the CNMV and the DGSFP; the third level consists of arbitral mechanisms, including consumer arbitration under Articles 57 and 58 of the General Law for the Protection of Consumers and Users (Legislative Royal Decree No. 1/2007) and general arbitration under Law No. 60/2003; and the fourth and final level corresponds to judicial resolution by the competent courts.[25]

A comparison with the Italian experience, however, highlights structural differences. The Italian legal system has developed mechanisms formally designated as «arbitral bodies», whose decisions – although not equivalent to judicial rulings – exhibit a high degree of formalisation and publicity and, in the case of the ABF, a significant level of compliance.[26] In Spain, by contrast, the model is more distinctly administrative and less “para-judicial”, centred on technical opinions issued by supervisory authorities.

The new wording of Article 30 of Law No. 44/2002 governs the submission of complaints, grievances and inquiries to the Bank of Spain, the CNMV and the DGSFP, according to a principle of provisionality, as these services will remain in operation until the establishment of the entity referred to in the First Additional Provision of Law No. 7/2017, which transposes Directive 2013/11/EU on ADR for consumer disputes. This provision refers to “alternative dispute resolution entities in the field of financial services” and envisages the creation, by means of a specific law, of a single entity responsible for resolving consumer disputes in the financial sector, with either binding or non-binding decisions, to be notified to the European Commission following accreditation by the competent authority.

Such legislation will require financial institutions to participate in proceedings before this ADR entity for disputes within the scope of their activities. Other accredited entities covering consumer disputes across various economic sectors may also hear such cases, provided that both parties have voluntarily submitted to the procedure. The provision further establishes that “the Government shall submit to Parliament, within eight months of the entry into force of this law, a bill regulating the institutional system for the protection of financial consumers, including its organisation and functions”.

The creation of a separate and independent entity thus responds not only to a requirement of impartiality, but also to a European normative mandate to ensure effective consumer protection with respect to operators in the banking, financial and insurance sectors.[27]

The Independent Administrative Authority for the Protection of Financial Consumers is therefore conceived as a body endowed with full functional independence from the traditional supervisory authorities in these sectors. The draft legislation provides that the Authority shall have its own legal personality and operate autonomously with respect to supervisory bodies such as the Bank of Spain and the CNMV, whose competences do not extend to the appointment of its members.

It is thus evident that the different regulatory solutions reflect the specific features of the two legislative approaches examined, as well as the supervisory models adopted in the Italian and Spanish legal systems.

4. Concluding Remarks.

The analysis of the regulatory experiences in the field of out-of-court dispute resolution in the banking, financial and insurance sectors makes it possible to draw certain conclusions regarding the distinctive features of the respective frameworks.

First and foremost, the technological dimension emerges as a key aspect. Indeed, one of the most innovative and promising features of the current configuration of ADR mechanisms lies in the introduction of artificial intelligence into the processes of decision management and analysis.[28]

The decisions of the Italian Insurance Ombudsman (AAS) may serve as the basis for a form of sector-specific predictive justice, insofar as the systematic collection and publication of precedents contribute to the development of a coherent and uniform body of interpretation. Such a predictive function enhances legal certainty and enables undertakings to align their conduct with shared standards and emerging jurisprudential trends, within a forward-looking perspective that does not replace the decision-maker with an algorithm,[29] but rather contributes to a reduction in overall litigation.

In other terms, the issue may be linked to earlier applications of «bibliometric network analysis» and «topic modelling» in the evaluation of ADR case law.[30] Similarly, the technological dimension of the Insurance Ombudsman intersects with broader debates on online courts and so-called “smart courts”,[31] which have long attracted attention.[32]

This technological perspective is particularly relevant for the Italian experience, as the volume and diversity of cases will generate a dataset capable of supporting machine learning models designed to identify recurring patterns, interpretative convergences, and areas of uncertainty in the application of legal rules, also addressing the challenges posed by Fintech and Insurtech developments.[33]

However, the use of artificial intelligence should balanced by adequate ethical safeguards and transparency requirements, in order to avoid risks of algorithmic opacity and decision-making bias. Automation cannot result in a deficit of accountability:[34] decision-making must remain human, albeit supported by technological tools that enhance its quality and consistency, in line with the applicable principles in this field.[35]

In this sense, the AAS may, in the near future, become a laboratory for digital justice in the insurance sector, capable of combining technological innovation with substantive protection.

Against this background, it is evident that the divergence – both formal and substantive – between the out-of-court dispute resolution systems examined in this study stands in tension with the efforts of the European legislator to ensure a uniform level of consumer protection.[36]

These differences also become apparent when compared with judicial mechanisms. In this respect, Directive (EU) 2020/1828 introduced cross-border representative actions, allowing consumer associations in Member States to bring collective actions in other European jurisdictions, including jointly with entities from other Member States. By contrast, in the ADR context, it remains unclear how a consumer from another Member State may access an equivalent level of protection across different jurisdictions, given the heterogeneity of national systems.

An alternative solution for cross-border disputes could consist in the establishment of a single European authority, necessarily independent from the supervisory prerogatives of national authorities, entrusted with the out-of-court resolution of disputes in the banking, financial and insurance sectors.

These considerations bring the discussion back to the need for harmonisation, both of private law provisions across national legal systems[37] and of the remedies available to consumers.

From another perspective, the Spanish experience offers the advantage of unifying the available remedy in cases characterised by overlapping elements or functional interconnections,[38] such as disputes concerning unit-linked insurance policies[39] and their hybrid financial-insurance components.[40]

Moreover, in this direction, the Spanish unitary solution appears to continue the debate that has recently emerged in Italy regarding the desirability of consolidating the banking, financial and insurance sectors under a single regulatory framework. This is justified, on the one hand, by the progressive integration of the various components of financial intermediation and, on the other hand, by the absence of significant elements that would militate against such an approach. Indeed, it has been observed in the literature that the regulatory and supervisory separation between these sectors, both at national and European level, is largely attributable to historical and organisational reasons. While this separation undoubtedly affects the structure and modalities of supervision in each sector, it does not undermine the common principles underlying the three fields, nor their shared objectives of protection and stability.[41]

Beyond the specific features of national remedies and their regulatory significance, the comparison between out-of-court dispute resolution systems in the banking, financial and insurance sectors confirms the attention of national legislators towards consumer protection and the safeguarding of individual rights.

Authors:

Alberto J. Tapia Hermida is Full professor of Derecho Mercantil at Complutense University – Madrid.

Francesco Affinito is Lecturer in IT Law at G. Marconi University – Rome.

Although the work is the result of a shared reflection, paragraphs 3 is attributable to Alberto J. Tapia Hermida, paragraphs 2 to Francesco Affinito, and paragraphs 1 and 4 to both authors.

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[1] SICLARI, D., La tutela stragiudiziale in ambito bancario, finanziario e assicurativo: problemi e prospettive, in Rivista trimestrale di diritto dell’economia, n. 4, 2022, p. 395 ff.

[2] CAPRIGLIONE, F., MIGLIONICO A., The Italian Banking and Financial Arbitrator between iurisdictio and Strengthening of the Supervisory Function, in European Business Law Review, Vol. 23, Issue 3, 2012, pp. 333-346; PELLEGRINI, M., La soluzione delle controversie bancarie, in Rivista Trimestrale di Diritto dell’Economia, n. 1s, 2022, p. 150 ff.; SEPE, M., Brevi note sulla natura delle decisioni dell’ABF, in CAPRIGLIONE, F.,   PELLEGRINI, M., (Coords.), ABF e supervisione bancaria, Padova, 2011, p. 119 ff.

[3] PELLEGRINI, M., Le ADR (Alternative Dispute Resolution) in ambito bancario e finanziario, in CAPRIGLIONE, F., (Coord.), Manuale di diritto bancario e finanziario, Milano, 2024, p. 693 ff.; SOLDATI, N., L’Arbitro per le Controversie Finanziarie (ACF) tra ruolo di regolazione del mercato finanziario e di conformazione degli intermediari, in Contratto e Impresa, n. 2, 2022, pp. 449-479.

[4] SOLDATI, N., Il terzo pilastro ADR presso le autorità indipendenti: l’arbitro IVASS, in Assicurazioni, n. 1, 2023, pp. 75-104; ID., L’Arbitro Assicurativo (AAS): Il nuovo pilastro ADR delle Autorità di regolazione del mercato, in Contratto e Impresa, n. 3, 2025, pp. 698-725.

[5] For a more detailed analysis of the Spanish regulatory references, MULLERAT, R., Alternative Dispute Resolution in Catalonia, in Arbitration International, V. 16, Issue 2, 2000, pp. 225-238.

[6] Sánchez-Calero, F., Sánchez-Calero Guilarte, J., Comentario a la Ley 44/2002, de 22 de noviembre, de Medidas de Reforma del Sistema Financiero, Navarra, 2003.

[7] Regarding the details of the legislative amendments introduced, TAPIA HERMIDA, A.J., Modificación del sistema de defensa de la clientela financiera mediante la Ley 10/2025, in Diario LA LEY, Nº 10874, Sección Tribuna, January 2026; ID., “Marque el 666”: Modificación del sistema de defensa de la clientela financiera mediante la Ley 10/2025 reguladora de los servicios de atención a la clientela, in ajtapia.com, January 2026.

[8] Proyecto de Ley 121/000018 – Proyecto de Ley por la que se crea la Autoridad Administrativa Independiente de Defensa del Cliente Financiero para la resolución extrajudicial de conflictos entre las entidades financieras y sus clientes, in BOGC, 5 april 2024.

[9] TAPIA HERMIDA, A.J., Las tribulaciones de un modesto consumidor financiero perdido en el abismo digital de la “banca on line” ante la aprobación por el Consejo de Ministros del pasado 5 de abril anteproyecto de Ley de creación de la Autoridad Independiente de Defensa del Cliente Financiero, in ajtapia.com, abril 2022.

[10] GODWIN, A. (Coord.), The Cambridge Handbook of Twin Peaks Financial Regulation, Cambridge, 2021; VAN HENGEL, M., HILBERS, P., SCHOENMAKER, D., Experiences with the Dutch Twin Peaks Model: Lessons for Europe, in KELLERMANN, A.J.,  DE HAAN, J., DE VRIES, F., Financial Supervision in the 21st Century, New York, 2013, p. 185 ff..; Wymeersch, E., The structure of Financial Supervision in Europe: about single Financial Supervisors, Twin Peaks and Multiple Financial Supervisors, in European Business Organization Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2007.

[11] For the differences compared with the Italian model, LEMMA, V., Arbitro bancario finanziario e supervisione bancaria: unitarietà dell’intervento, in CAPRIGLIONE, F., PELLEGRINI, M. (Coords.), ABF e supervisione bancaria, Padova, 2011, pp. 133-141.

[12] MASCIANDARO, D., Vigilanza bancaria modello “twin peaks”, in ilsole24ore.com, December 2017.

[13] BARTOLINI, F., L’Arbitro Assicurativo: prime riflessioni sul Regolamento attuativo (d.m. n. 215/2024), in Giurisprudenza arbitrale, n. 1, 2025, pp. 134-142; GRECO, F., Il nuovo Arbitro Assicurativo (AAS), in Responsabilità civile e previdenza, n. 4, 2025, pp. 1413-1424.

[14] SOLDATI, N., Il terzo pilastro ADR presso le autorità indipendenti: l’arbitro IVASS, in Assicurazioni, n. 1, 2023, pp. 75-104; ID., L’Arbitro Assicurativo (AAS): Il nuovo pilastro ADR delle Autorità di regolazione del mercato, in Contratti e Impresa, n. 3, 2025, pp. 698-725.

[15] RIGANTI, F., Questioni attuali e prospettiche sull’alternative dispute resolution nei settori regolamentati (tra «giustizia» e «vigilanza»), in Giurisprudenza arbitrale, n. 1, 2022, pp. 77-104.

[16] For a deeper analysis of the relationship between law and reputation, SHAPIRA, R., Law and Reputation. How the legal system shapes behavior by producing information, Cambridge, 2020.

[17] CAPRIGLIONE, F., Manuale di diritto bancario e finanziario, Milano, 2024, p. 26 ff.

[18] LANDINI, S., Criteri e parametri per la vigilanza regolamentare: il caso della sostenibilità, in Assicurazioni, n. 3, 2025, p. 499 ff.

[19] RIGANTI, F., Questioni attuali e prospettiche sull’alternative dispute resolution nei settori regolamentati (tra «giustizia» e «vigilanza»), in Giurisprudenza arbitrale, n. 1, 2022, pp. 77-104.

[20] LANDINI, S., Criteri e parametri per la vigilanza regolamentare: il caso della sostenibilità, in Assicurazioni, n. 3, 2025, p. 480 ff.

[21] CAPRIGLIONE, F., PELLEGRINI, M. (Coords.), ABF e supervisione bancaria, Padova, 2011.

[22] BATALLER GRAU, J., Spanish System, in HEISS, H., LORENZON, M., NABHOLZ, A.C., OSTROWSKA, M., Insurance Ombudsman Schemes. A Comparative Analysis, New York, 2025, pp. 333-354.

[23] TAPIA HERMIDA, A.J., Defensa del asegurado en el contrato de seguro y del partícipe en el plan de pensiones. Comparación. Semejanzas y diferencias. La protección del cliente en el mercado asegurador, (dirs. BATALLER, J., VEIGA COPO, A.), Ed. Civitas/ Thomson, Cizur Menor, 2014, pp. 153-185; ID., Derecho de Seguros y Fondos de Pensiones, Colección Manuales, Ed. Iustel, 1ª Edición, Madrid, 2014; ID., Guía del Contrato de Seguro, 2ª ed., Colección Monografías Aranzadi, Aranzadi, Cizur Menor, 2022.

[24] It is a type of massive structure built in ancient Mesopotamia and Iran, shaped like a complex of terraced floors or levels that recede successively.

[25] TAPIA HERMIDA, A.J., Soluciones a conflictos entre las aseguradoras, los mediadores y su clientela en el mercado asegurador. La escalada al Zigurat: Conferencia en SEAIDA el pasado viernes día 13 de marzo de 2026, in ajtapia.com, march 2026.

[26] SEPE, M., Brevi note sulla natura delle decisioni dell’ABF, in CAPRIGLIONE, F., PELLEGRINI M. (Coords.), ABF e supervisione bancaria, Padova, 2011, p. 119 ff.

[27] TAPIA HERMIDA, A.J., Concurso y mercados financieros (I): reestructuración, saneamiento y concurso de entidades de crédito, empresas de servicios de inversión y entidades aseguradoras. Manual de Derecho Concursal. Cap. XXIII, 5ª ed., Pulgar Ezquerra, J. (Dir.), Gutiérrez Gilsanz, A., Megías López, J., Recamán Graña, E. (Coords,), Ed. Aranzadi La Ley – La Ley Soluciones Legales, Madrid 2024, pp. 801-822.

[28] On the topic of the use of Artificial Intelligence in ADR, Roskoshnyi, I., Intelligence Augmentation in Alternative Dispute Resolution, in Reimer, L.E., Jochelson, R. (Coords.), The Other Side of the Bar. Conflict Transformation in Legal Practice, New York, 2025, pp. 267-294; alanissamy, P., Magd, H., Kesavamoorthy, R., Digital Technologies and the Dispute Resolution. The Future of Digital Justice, in Salman, A., Dahal, N., Wood, J., Razzaq, M.A. (Coords.), Informatics, Technologies and Digitalization in the age of Transformation, New York, 2025, pp. 115-122.

[29] AFFINITO, F., La risoluzione delle controversie in ambito bancario e finanziario tra giustizia algoritmica, Fintech e Metaverso, in Archivio Giuridico Sassarese, n. 2, 2022, pp. 9-31.

[30] Mota, F.B., Braga, L.A.M., Pereira Cabral, B., Alternative Dispute Resolution Research Landscape from 1981 to 2022, in Group Decision and Negotiation, n. 32, 2023, pp. 1415-1435.

[31] TANG, Z.S., Smart Court. The court of the future, Cambridge, 2025; Beebeejaun, Z., Faccia, A., Electronic alternative dispute resolution, smart contracts and equity in the energy sector, in J World Energy Law Bus, n. 15, 2022, pp. 97-113.

[32] GENN, H., Online courts and the future of justice, Oxford, 2017; LEWIS, S., Precedent and the Rule of Law, in Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 41, n. 4, 2021, p. 873 ff.; Katsh, E., Rabinovich-Einy, O., Digital Justice. Technology and the Internet of Disputes, Oxford University Press, 2017; REED, C., Making Laws for Cyberspace, Oxford University Press, 2012; Reiling, D., Beyond Court Digitalization with Online Dispute Resolution, in International Journal for Court Administration, vol. 8, n. 2, 2017; Ryberg, J.,  Roberts, J.V., Sentencing and Artificial Intelligence, Oxford University Press, 2022; Susskind, R., Online Courts and the future of Justice, Oxford University Press, 2021; ID., The future of Law, Oxford University Press, 1996; ID., Making the case for online courts, Oxford University Press, 2018; ID., Experts system in Law, 1987; ID., Transforming the Law, Oxford University Press, 2000; THOMSON, S., Ombudsmen as Courts, in Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 42, n. 1, 2022, p. 76 ff.; Yeung, K., Lodge, M., Algorithmic Regulation, Oxford University Press, 2019; Williams, R., Rethinking Administrative Law for Algorithmic Decision Making, in Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 42, n. 2, 2022, p. 468 ff.

[33] LEMMA, V., FinTech Regulation: Exploring New Challenges of the Capital Markets Union, Londres, 2020; ID., The regulation of Fintech banks: questions and perspectives, in Open Review of Management, Banking and Finance, vol. 5, n. 2, 2019, p. 30 ff.; ROTONDO, G., Risoluzione stragiudiziale delle controversie e FinTech, in PARACAMPO, M.T. (Coord.), Fintech. Introduzione ai profili giuridici di un mercato unico tecnologico dei servizi finanziari, 2021, p. 343 ff.; TAPIA HERMIDA, A.J., Insurtech. Revolución digital, Derecho mercantil y token economía. Muñoz Pérez, A.F. (Dir.), De la Orden de la Cruz, C., Martínez Laburta, C. (Coords,), Ed. Tecnos, Madrid, 2019, pp. 544-559.

[34] BIANCO, M. L’intelligenza artificiale nei sistemi ADR: opportunità e presidi, speech delivered on 17 July 2025 at the assembly of the Italian Banking and Financial Ombudsman.

[35] TAPIA HERMIDA, A.J., Claves de la Ley europea de inteligencia artificial: Reglamento (UE) 2024/1689 de 13 de junio de 2024, LA LEY Unión Europea, n. 133, Sección Regulación, february 2025; ID., Decálogo de la Ley Europea de Inteligencia Artificial. Reglamento (UE) 2024/1689. Diario La Ley, Sección Tribuna, 31 January 2025, La Ley.

[36] TAPIA HERMIDA, A.J., La nueva normativa de consumo en España y en la Unión Europea, Madrid, 2022.

[37] ANDENAS, M., National paradigms of civil enforcement: Mutual recognition or harmonization in Europe?, in ANDENAS, M., HESS, B., OBERHAMMER, P. (Coords.), Enforcement Agency Practice in Europe, London, 2005.

[38] CORRIAS, P. Le aree di interferenza delle attività bancaria e assicurativa tra tutela dell’utente e esigenze di armonizzazione del mercato finanziario, in Giustizia civile, n. 3, 2015, pp. 617-639; ID., Le mutevoli relazioni tra attività bancaria e assicurativa, in Vita notarile, n. 1, 2020, pp. 21-38.

[39] TAPIA HERMIDA, A.J., Noción del Seguro de Vita Unit-Linked, in TAPIA HERMIDA, A.J., TOLSADA M.Y. (Coords.), in Seguros Unit Linked. Libro Blanco, in Revista Española de Seguros, n. 176, 2018. Para un mayor análisis y sobre el concepto de «ornitorrincos financieros», TAPIA HERMIDA, A.J., El trípode virtuoso de la relación de UNESPA con SEAIDA: Presentación de número 175 de la Revista Española de Seguros, in ajtapia.com, mach 2024; ID., Entramado financiero complejo: Préstamo hipotecario para adquirir productos financieros. Seguros de vida e inversión (“unit linked”). Nulidad molecular expansiva por información deficiente a los clientes. Sentencia núm.1315/2025, de 29 de septiembre de la Sala Primera de lo Civil del Tribunal Supremo, in ajtapia.com, october 2025; ID., Los seguros de vida e inversión ante la nueva Ley 6/2023 de 17 de marzo, de los mercados de valores y de los servicios de inversión (LMVSI) y la jurisprudencia del TJUE. Jornada técnica de SEAIDA y VALIRO sobre Seguros Unit Linked, in ajtapia.com, march 2023; ID., Seguros de vida e inversión (“unit link”). Obligación de información precontractual sobre la naturaleza de los activos. Sentencia del TJUE de 24 de febrero de 2022, in ajtapia.com, mach 2022; ID., Seguros de vida e inversión (“unit link”) colectivos. Oscuridad de sus condiciones como una práctica comercial desleal por omisión engañosa. Responsabilidad de la entidad aseguradora y del banco tomador y derecho de resolución del asegurado. Sentencia del TJUE de 2 de febrero de 2023, in ajtapia.com, march 2023.

[40] On the subject, reference is made to CAPRIGLIONE, F., Le polizze “unit linked”: prodotti assicurativi con finalità d’investimento, in La Nuova Giurisprudenza Civile Commentata, n. 9, 2014, 2, p. 426 ff.

[41] SEPE, M., Integrazione orizzontale: verso un testo unico delle attività finanziarie, in AA.VV., A 30 anni dal Testo unico bancario (1993-2023): The Test of Time.  Conference proceedings Banca d’Italia – ADDE, Roma, 11-12 diciembre 2023, in Banca d’Italia, Quaderni di Ricerca Giuridica, n. 100, marzo 2024, pp. 75-81, that argues “(…) The considerations made so far have not addressed the insurance sector (and therefore the CAP), nor whether it could or should also be subject to a possible reconductio ad unum with the financial sector (and therefore with the TUB and TUF). It seems to me that there are no decisive arguments to exclude it, based on an ontological difference between financial and insurance services. Obviously, the proximity between the two worlds is evident and cannot be questioned when referring to that type of insurance activity characterized by its links with the financial world (in life insurance, in particular classes I, II, V and VI, and in non-life insurance, in particular classes 14 credit insurance and 15 surety bonds, direct and indirect). But even where such a characteristic is not evident, there are elements that lead to a unitary consideration of the financial and insurance phenomenon. These elements appear to be found: a) in the fact that both activities concern savings; b) in the fiduciary nature that characterizes the performance of both activities and that constitutes a defining element (linked to the deferment in time of the benefit to be received, which justifies the system of controls in place); c) in the fact that, in both cases, the benefit is intended for the preservation (in a broad sense) of the saver’s assets (in terms of maintenance/increase in financial activity, and in terms of preventing a decrease related to indemnification in insurance activity). On the other hand, the fact that the supervisory system of the banking, securities, and insurance sectors is regulated, both at national and European level, in different legal frameworks is essentially due to historical reasons, also related to the organization and structure of supervisory controls in each country’s legal systems, while nonetheless it remains difficult to dispute the existence of a set of substantially common and cross-sector principles, such as those relating to the micro- and macroprudential objectives pursued and the structure and forms of prudential supervision”.